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and a cultural heritage. He does not get what he had 
hoped for, namely, a categorical argument for saving 
the family farm. But this does not seem necessary 
anyway for reasons noted above. 
The question of what we ought to do as a nation 
seems to me to be more complex, however. Preservation 
of the traditional family farm and rural life will require 
the outlay of public funds; all are in agreement about 
that. Decisions about the rightness or wrongness of 
providing such funds must be made within the context 
of shrinking economic and natural resources and of 
other claims for the protection of many different kinds 
of interests. Some of these interests are based on the 
prior commitments of the government to serve the 
population in certain ways, and other interests take the 
form of claims concerning basic human rights. Family 
farmers must make their claims about justice within an 
ongoing social sphere that is populated, for instance, 
by the inner city poor and homeless, the increasing 
poverty of our children, high infant mortality, inequity 
in health care and education, and the continued 
mistreatment of animals and the environment. It may 
well be that we should save family farms, but there will 
be a price to pay in unmet needs of others. Thus, we 
must have a clearer understanding of the inter-
relationship of these interests and of how to give them 
just consideration. I think this precludes categorical 
conclusions about the fate of the family farm but leaves 
open the possibility for making good arguments about 
how our institutions should be arranged to protect the 
public interest and individual rights. 
Notwithstanding my reservations noted above, I 
recommend this book to those who are interested in 
exploring these issues in some depth. No text or 
anthology can encompass all views. Most of the essays 
are clear, well-written, and accessible to even the novice. 
I have no doubt that as a classroom text it will provoke 
a large amount of useful debate and enlightenment. 
Notes 
The definition of just what constitutes a "family-farm" 
has been the center of contention, since many large corporate 
farms, such as Cargill, are owned and operated by a family. 
rn the "rntroduction," Comstock accepts Luther Tweeten's 
definition with a modification noted here in italics: "a family 
farm is an agricultural operation loved, worked, and owned 
by a family or family corporation, with gross annual sales of 
forty thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars. hiring 
less than 1.5 person-years of labor" (p. xxv). 
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It is a pleasure to be asked to comment on Kathryn 
P. George's review, and not only because she so 
insightfully criticizes the book I edited. Her review 
provides me the additional opportunity to declare in 
public that I have changed my mind about the respective 
rights of animals and family farmers. As George points 
out, I argue in my conclusion that you can defend 
traditional family farms and animals. My reason is that, 
even though the backbone of family farming is the 
raising and slaughtering of food animals, smaller sized 
"family" farms seem more likely than larger sized 
"factory" farms to provide animals with humane care, 
room to exercise, and quick, painless deaths. 
Since finishing Famity Farm, I have come to believe 
that humane care and slaughter are not the issues. The 
issues are whether we harm animals with central nervous 
systems when we kill them, and whether we have the 
right to continue breeding mammals, with no other 
purpose in mind than to carve them into steaks at a young 
age. This is likely to be the issue of most concern to 
readers of BTS, so I begin here, reserving for later my 
comments on George's criticisms of my family farm 
argument. 
I have learned from feminists and narrativists the 
value of first person stories in ethical discourse, and I 
think it is important for ethicists to tell their stories, 
especially when they have given up major parts of their 
background beliefs. I have given up a major part of my 
background beliefs, and I must tell you how it happened. 
I was not motivated by professional considerations 
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alone when I began working on Family Farm.. It is 
true that I thought Iowa State University, a land-grant 
school in the middle of the U.S. heartland, needed 
someone doing research on the topic, but I took up the 
issue as much out of personal as academic reasons. As 
readers of the book are told in the "Introduction," my 
Uncle Harold and Aunt Sandy Pippert faced financial 
difficulties on their farm in Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, 
in the mid-1980's. The first Pippert farmers in that 
county were my great-great-grandfather and great-great-
grandmother. That was around 1860. Around 1939, 
my grandma and grandpa bought the 160 acres Harold 
and Sandy now farm, and on which my brothers and 
sister and cousins and I spent large chunks of our 
childhood. The home place is dear to me. My wife 
and children have taken a liking to it, too, and we 
regularly visit there. Our favorite weekend activity is 
to go to Nora Springs on Friday night to watch the high 
school football game. This fall, my cousin Jason played 
fullback and his sister Jenny led cheers from the sideline. 
I tell you all of this to stress how much the Pippert 
farm means to me. Our stories tell us about our back-
ground beliefs and about the narrative traditions in which 
our ethical beliefs are formed. For me, the continued 
existence of family farms is not an abstract problem in 
applied ethics, and I cannot approach it with disembodied 
principles or a utilitarian calculus. I care about the Pippert 
farm, and I love my aunt and uncle and cousins. 
The economic health of the Pippert farm rests on 
the practice of raising and slaughtering animals. In the 
summer, Uncle Harold,like his father, grandfather, and 
great-grandfather before him, raises corn, soybeans, 
oats, barley, and hay. Eighty percent or more of these 
crops are converted into feed grains for cows and pigs 
and chickens. All of the chickens are gone from the 
farm now, and the handful of hogs and cattle that remain 
are little more than Jason's last 4-H project before going 
off to college. Nonetheless, Harold and Sandy's corn 
crop is a money maker because it winds up in front of 
animals at cattle feedlot, hog confinement, or broiler 
hen operations. 
When the book was published in February, 1988, 
everyone on my side of the family ate meat, and so did 
L None of us, I dare say, thought much about it. As I 
began to think about it, I had a fleeting thought: to 
reject meat might be equivalent to rejecting the history 
and identity of the Pippert family. I say it was a fleeting 
thought because I purposely put it out of my mind. I 
thought it morally insensitive to waste my time 
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exploring the rights of hogs and cattle at a time when 
the economic pressures on hog and cattle raisers were 
so severe. The playing field was so biased against 
smaller farmers, and smaller farmers I problems 
produced so much anxiety, that I found myself 
wondering what sort of person would ask questions 
about the well-being of farm hogs when the well-being 
of farm children was at stake. 
After finishing the book, Igave the issue the attention 
it deserves. I realized very quickly that the intentional 
killing of hogs at six months of age, when the animals 
might otherwise live for a period ten times that length, 
calls for justification. I looked for philosophical 
defenses of meat-eating, and found remarkably few. 
Other than R. G. Frey, very few ethicists have taken it 
upon themselves to defend meat-eating.! Reading Tom 
Regan's The Case for AnirnalRightsconvinced me that 
some mammals probably have mental lives roughly 
analogous to some humans' mental lives, and that some 
mammals are conscious beings with social lives much 
like some humans' social lives.2 I did not come to 
believe nonhuman mammals are morally autonomous, 
but I did not see why that fact should entitle us to kill 
and eat them.3 Idid decide that a central issue is whether 
a being has the potential to have interests, in the sense 
of"able to take an interestin something." For ifa being 
potential1y has interests in this strong sense, it 
potentially has the ability to take an interest in things 
in its future. Having the potential to take an interest in 
things in your future, it seems, should be all you need 
to give others the duty not to kill you, in the absence of 
good reasons to kill you. 
Do cows and pigs and chickens have the potential 
to take an interest in things in their future? I think this 
is largely an unsettled empirical matter, and it calls for 
psychological, neurological, and ethological study. I 
cannot say that I know for certain what the answer will 
be. But in the absence of an answer, it seems we ought 
to err on the side of caution. That means not killing (or 
breeding more of) cows and pigs and chickens unless 
we have strong reasons to override our duty not to harm 
individuals. Providing ourselves with protein is not a 
strong reason, and neither is scientific research to find 
out whether animals have future interests. We can get 
plenty of protein from vegetable sources, and we can 
live happy lives without vivisecting animals. 
Thus I came to believe I ought to be a vegetarian. 
As many readers of this journal know, to become a 
vegetarian is much more difficult than to decide to 
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become a vegetarian. Slowly, over the course of several 
years, with much opposition, and much support, from 
various members of my family, I gave up meat and fish. 
What finally pushed me over the edge was Tom Regan's 
account of Barry Holstum Lopez's stories about wolves 
planning ambushes of caribou.4 If wolves anticipate 
the course of caribou several days hence, and devise 
and follow plans to surprise their prey at a given point, 
I can no longer believe that all nonhuman mammals 
are unable to take an interest in things in their future. 
Nor can I continue to think it ethically unproblematic 
to raise and slaughter so-called food animals. 
Professor George notices how briefly I discuss 
animal rights in my conclusion. Kindly, she does not 
charge me with the philosophical coward's way out, 
begging the question. Unfortunately for me, the charge 
sticks. I wrote only that proving animals have rights" 
is very difficult to do" and tried to leave my reader with 
the impression that animals do not have rights. George 
calls me on the point. 
But if I now believe pigs and cows have a right to 
life, how do I square this belief with my continuing 
love for family farms? Can you defend the rights of 
animals and the rights of famil y farmers? To the extent 
that family farms require the premature killing of 
animals, the answer seems to be "no." But that answer 
need not be read as a condemnation of the way of life 
offamily farming, because farming is possible without 
slaughtering animals. For most farmers in the Midwest, 
raising animals, or raising feedgrains for animals, is 
the largest part of the agricultural economy, and to 
change this situation calls for radical adjustments. Yet 
food animals are not the sum total of farming, even in 
the Combelt, and there will be plenty left over for 
farmers to do if one day there is no longer a market 
for beef and pork. There will always be green beans, 
broccoli, and sweet potatoes, apples, pears, and 
oranges, filberts, almonds, and pecans to raise. A tofu-
cooking, vegetarian America will need lots of soybean 
and (sweet) com farmers. 
That said, I must add that the possibility exists that 
a vegetarian America might not need the current system 
of medium sized, owner-operated, farms. Suppose that 
efficient vegetable farming can be done on very large, 
"factory" farms. Suppose, too, that these large vegetable 
farms are owned by union workers who plant, weed, 
rotate, and harvest crops in an ecologically sound 
manner. An efficient and equitable and environmentally 
sustainable farm system such as the one I am now 
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imagining might render current "family" farms obsolete. 
The likelihood is not great, but the possibility exists. 
This leads me to George's reservations about the 
way I qualify my final argument "from responsibility" 
for family farms. George rightly points out that 
arguments need not be "categorical" arguments in order 
to be persuasive moral arguments. And yet it is equally 
true that arguments that rest on highly contingent socio-
economic conditions will lack the force of arguments 
that do not rest as heavily on variable social conditions. 
Suppose that this year small family farms have a 
comparative advantage over large factory farms because 
of technologies of scale. Suppose that technologies and 
world markets change and five years later the advantage 
has switched to large farms. The socio-economic 
conditions that support arguments about the superior 
efficiency of family farms may change, and the next 
year, family farms may not be as efficient as others. 
Would we want to rest our claims for family farms on 
grounds as variable as the grounds just mentioned? 
Because the efficiency of family farms is the 
weakest argument that can be made for preferring 
family farms to factory farms, I searched for something 
stronger on which to rest my case. If there are no 
stronger grounds, then I see no reason to consider 
asking nonfarm taxpayers to bear costs associated with 
saving family farms. If, on the other hand, there are 
much stronger grounds for saving family farms, such 
as "These farms serve basic cultural, social, and 
spiritual needs of the nation," then we may be justified 
in asking taxpayers to bear short-term costs in order 
to achieve long-term ends. 
It was in the interest of finding the strongest moral 
argument for family farms that I turned to arguments 
from stewardship and cultural identity. I may, as 
Kathryn George and Paul Thompson both suggest, make 
too little out of these arguments. 5 But there are 
weaknesses in both arguments, and my own argument 
from responsibility tries to draw on the strengths of the 
others, while avoiding the others' weaknesses. 
On another point, George suggests the book needs a 
discussion of moral theories, and again, she is right. 
had, however, to place certain limits on what could be 
included, and I decided to include farmers' stories and 
religious statements about the farm crisis rather than 
philosophers' discussions of metaethics. While the latter 
is readily available in textbooks, the former is not. 
Even had I chosen to include more ethical theory, I 
would not have thought to argue that family farmers 
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have a moral right to demand support from land-grant 
universities, or at least the right to demand that research 
at such universities serve the needs of smaller farmers. 
I find this an intriguing and promising idea, and I hope 
George will have more to say about it. 
A last thought, about the place of religion in secular 
ethics. I made an effort to include in the book 
contributions from various Christian thinkers. There 
are various reasons for this choice, the strongest two 
reasons being: the intimate historical connection 
between Christianity and the development of this 
country's rural areas and the recent appearance of 
strong statements supporting family farms from 
various church groups. 
George apparently wants to exelude religion from 
secular discussions of ethics, a desire not foreign to 
many contemporary philosophers. It is not a desire I 
share. Moral values in the West clearly derive 
historically from religious traditions, and some moral 
values are also grounded ontologically on religious 
beliefs. I do not mean, of course, that all of ethics rests 
on religion, nor do I want to defend Divine Command 
theories. I mean only to acknowledge the rationality of 
thinking about religious values, practices, beliefs, and 
institutions as one thinks about applied ethics and public 
policy. I mean to suggest that public discussion of 
ethical matters would occasionally be strengthened by 
careful, intellectually respectable, theological discourse. 
I actually believe we have too little, not too much, public 
God-talk, a situation obscured by the fact that the public 
God-talk we do have comes almost exclusively from 
Presidents of the United States and television 
evangelists. If more politicians, academics, and 
business folk were more forthcoming publicly about 
the religious convictions they hold privately, their 
religious and moral convictions would probably be more 
rational. Public discourse about ethics would be more 
enlightened and elevated. Toward this end, we continue 
to seek contributions from representatives of various 
religious traditions at the annual ethics conference at 
Iowa State University. 
Theology is not irrelevant to philosophical ethics or 
public policy. George rightly points out that not 
everyone agrees with the premises of theological 
arguments, but that is no reason to rule theological 
premises out of bounds. If we were to dismiss 
arguments any time we could find people who disagreed 
with the premises, ethical debate would be impossible. 
And democracy would be in a far sorrier state than it is 
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already. You may have serious objections to the 
conclusions of the various statements of the U.S. 
Catholic Bishops and the National Council of Churches, 
and you may find the reasoning in the documents 
abysmal. But that should not make you want to censor 
such groups. It should make you want to educate them, 
challenge them to do better. Philosophy is not about 
excluding people from the conversation but, rather, 
about continuing the conversation with everyone of 
good will who wants to continue in it. 
George helps me see how we might continue this 
particular conversation in some fruitful directions. For 
that, I thank her, again. 
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